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INTRODUCTION 
It is a fine thing to do well by the commonwealth, but to speak well of it is not 
contemptible.1 
At the close of the 2012 UC Irvine “‘Law As . . .’ II, History As Interface for 
the Interdisciplinary Study of Law” symposium, someone commented to the 
effect that a unifying undercurrent of the proceedings was “disgust” with the 
sovereign state. I took the comment as a marker of the sensus communis common to 
many critics of law and state.2 It is not just emoting. It is venting a reflective 
ethical stance of disaffection, or even “self-subtraction” from the state, imagined 
as a hostis humani generis—in the name of a transformative politics of social justice, 
freedom, and democracy.3 And it reprises a pattern of connections between 
 
* University of California, San Diego. 
1. Letter from Alexander Wedderburn to Sir Gilbert Elliot of Minto (July 2, 1757), reprinted in 
JAMES BUCHAN, CAPITAL OF THE MIND: HOW EDINBURGH CHANGED THE WORLD 369 n.1 
(2003). Wedderburn was a leading Scotch lawyer and politician and a friend of David Hume.  
2. In regard to its distance from the genre of theoretical critique of the state and its sense of 
the sufficiency of contextual description, this Article echoes the argument of DAVID SAUNDERS, 
ANTI-LAWYERS: RELIGION AND THE CRITICS OF LAW AND STATE (1997). On this, compare Peter 
Goodrich, Law-Induced Anxiety: Legists, Anti-Lawyers and the Boredom of Legality, 9 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 
143, 154–59 (2000), with conservatism. Of course, not all legal theory is committed to critique. Cf. 
Anton Schütz, ‘Legal Critique’: Elements for a Genealogy, 16 L. & CRITIQUE 71 (2005). Schütz presents 
himself as an insider-critic of critical legal theory. Like Saunders, Schütz too (in this Article) focuses 
on critique as an historical transformation of Christian intellectual programs.  
3. WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST 180 (1997) (“[D]isgust has certain 
virtues for voicing moral assertions. It signals seriousness, commitment, indisputability, presentness, 
and reality.”). On “self-subtraction,” as understood by Alain Badiou, see ALAIN BADIOU, 
METAPOLITICS 87–88 ( Jason Barker trans., Verso 2005) (1998).  
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expressions of disgust and promises of transcendence in the history of Western 
metaphysics, from ancient Stoicism through Shaftesbury to Kant’s aesthetic 
philosophy, and into Marxist and other theory.4 
In contrast, my Article sees the state as a locus of a de-transcendentalizing 
political civility indifferent to uppermost principles. It is not a theory of the state, 
or a philosophical justification. There are moments of philosophical argument, 
and a normative stance, but the main intent is to describe an early modern way of 
“norming” a state from within. There is a doctrine to grasp, but also a mentalité 
d’état, a habitus. A name for this undertaking might be an ethnography of 
jurisprudential habits of mind, though it is also an exercise in rhetoric.5 
For we are dealing with an old clash between styles of arguing shaped by 
persuasive devices of which logical argument is one, by passions, institutional 
milieus and their standings, self-culture, and danger. My vignette of a gesture of 
disgust for the state, and the gesture itself, evinced rival “thought-imbued 
intensities” of affection and disaffection, association and dissociation.6 The 
sentimental economy associated with state civility tends toward, in David Hume’s 
words, the “calm” as distinct from the “violent” end of the passional spectrum. A 
calm passion like imperturbability is not per se more rational than, say, moral 
disgust.7 Jurisprudence is not all rhetoric, but there are affinities between rhetoric 
and a dispassionate jurisprudential ethos. 
Metaphysics has not always channeled disgust for the state, or a 
transformative ethos.8 Still, these are common ways to cut a figure in critical-
 
4. See Jeffrey Minson, Resonances of “Raillery,” in BLACK SPHINX: ON THE COMEDIC IN 
MODERN ART 35, 45 (John C. Welchman ed., 2010) (adumbrating links to modern theory, including 
the famous Derridean connection between disgust and Kantian beauty). Particularly pertinent here is 
the link between the surprisingly rationalist theme of aesthetic transcendence in ANTHONY ASHLEY 
COOPER, THIRD EARL OF SHAFTESBURY, CHARACTERISTICS OF MEN, MANNERS, OPINIONS, 
TIMES (Lawrence E. Klein ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1999) (1711) [hereinafter SHAFTESBURY, 
CHARACTERISTICS OF MEN], and Shaftesbury’s private notebooks, collected in THE LIFE, 
UNPUBLISHED LETTERS, AND PHILOSOPHICAL REGIMEN OF ANTHONY, EARL OF SHAFTESBURY 
1–272 (Benjamin Rand ed., 1900) [hereinafter SHAFTESBURY, THE LIFE]. These contain spiritual 
exercises modeled on those of the ancient Stoic Epictetus, and crafted to create disgust with 
Shaftesbury’s own sociable conduct where it clashes with Stoic principles. See SHAFTESBURY, THE 
LIFE, supra, at 183. Such conduct is likened to “vomit.” See id. 
5. This Article further develops an argument about the intersections of rhetoric, ethics, and 
civil politics presented in JEFFREY MINSON, QUESTIONS OF CONDUCT: SEXUAL HARASSMENT, 
CITIZENSHIP, GOVERNMENT (1993). In particular, see Chapter 2, “Kant, Rhetoric and Civility.” Id. at 
16–40.  
6. See WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, WHY I AM NOT A SECULARIST 27, 29 (1999), on “thought-
imbued intensities moving below linguistic sophistication . . . and reflective judgment as well as 
through them.”  
7. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, 418–19 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford 
Univ. Press 2d ed. 1978) (1739). The distinction between violent versus calm passions is part of a 
descriptive matrix: “We must, therefore, distinguish betwixt a calm and a weak passion; betwixt a 
violent and a strong one.” Id. at 419. Hume is struck by how often a violent passion does not become 
“a settled principle of action” and can morph into calmer forms. Id. at 418–19. 
8. Shaftesbury himself approved of the British state as an antidote to violent religious 
“enthusiasm.” See SHAFTESBURY, CHARACTERISTICS OF MEN, supra note 4, at 68–69.  
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intellectual society, where, “[t]o be a friend of the state has been made to seem an 
index either of stupidity or of corrupt purpose.”9 “The state as idiot” is one of the 
varieties of “state-scepticism” in criminological discourses that Ian Loader and 
Neil Walker moderate as a prelude to re-theorizing security as a state-based yet 
democratic good.10 Pitting democracy against the state is a popular trope too. In a 
post-Cold War movie, a submarine commander tells his mutinous crew members: 
“We are here to preserve democracy, not to practice it.”11 Crimson Tide renders this 
military maxim illegible. Uttered by a rogue officer intent on starting a world war 
by launching a thermonuclear device, it can only signify a representative of the 
state’s rationalization of egregious nondemocratic authority. 
 So what intellectual heat-seeking missile am I about to launch? Taking the 
opening aphorism by Alexander Wedderburn as my motto, the Article offers an 
anatomy of the ethical face of a public law doctrine of the state as nondemocratic 
and de-idealized sovereign. This ever-contested doctrine came out of an early 
modern European tradition known inter alia as “civil prudence” or “civil 
philosophy.” It targeted the driver of internecine warfare, powerful states 
dedicated—in part via metaphysical teachings—to the salvific goals of religious 
confessions. Civil philosophy, it has been said, sought to “dismantl[e] the legal and 
political architecture of the confessional state,” contributing to a “desacralization 
of politics” in which public authority was obliged to be committed only to worldly 
civil ends.12 
That desacralizing aim, limited though it was, has only ever been imperfectly 
realized. Concomitantly, civil prudence’s fate was to be appropriated in piecemeal, 
tacit, or contorting ways by later traditions of political and juristic thought.13 To 
 
9. JOHN DUNN, THE CUNNING OF UNREASON: MAKING SENSE OF POLITICS 246 (2000).  
10. IAN LOADER & NEIL WALKER, CIVILIZING SECURITY 117–40 (2007).  
11. CRIMSON TIDE (Hollywood Pictures 1995). See also this Article’s concluding remarks, 
infra Part V, for further comment on the defending versus practicing democracy maxim.  
12. See IAN HUNTER, THE SECULARISATION OF THE CONFESSIONAL STATE: THE 
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF CHRISTIAN THOMASIUS 14 (2007); J.G.A. Pocock, Religious Freedom and the 
Desacralization of Politics: From the English Civil Wars to the Virginia Statute, in THE VIRGINIA STATUTE 
FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: ITS EVOLUTION AND CONSEQUENCES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 43, 45 
(Merrill D. Peterson & Robert C. Vaughan eds., 1988). 
13. In what follows, I make intermittent comparisons between civil prudence and liberal 
thinking (omitting significant conservative and other repositories of civil prudential thought). The 
version of liberalism closest to civil prudence derives from a historical distinction between tolerance-
and-pluralism-based liberalism and equal-libertarian versions in the Kantian-rationalist tradition. See, 
e.g., JOHN GRAY, TWO FACES OF LIBERALISM 2 (2000) (contrasting a view of liberal institutions as 
“applications of universal principles” with one that sees them as “a means to peaceful coexistence”). 
See also STEVEN D. SMITH, GETTING OVER EQUALITY: A CRITICAL DIAGNOSIS OF RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM IN AMERICA 15, 20 (2001), for a parallel jurisprudential perspective; for example, the 
wedge Smith drives between James Madison’s invoking a question-begging “formal principle of 
equality” in his Memorial and Remonstrance and his pluralist arguments in Federalist 10 and 51 for 
institutional structures that permit the “multiplicity of sects” to flourish rather than subjecting them 
to some supposedly substantive principle of free exercise. Stephen Holmes, in STEPHEN HOLMES, 
PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 100–01 (1995), attempts 
to reclaim for liberal political philosophy early modern understandings of limited government, those 
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appreciate how civil prudence differs from these inheritor-traditions requires 
returning to its undiluted earlier forms. I try to reassemble it, to defamiliarize 
constituents like the trope of protection and to appreciate how they cohere inside 
a stand-alone “de-idealized” ethic of state. My hypothesis is that civil prudence 
yields a state form that is neither an essentially amoral power entity, nor acquires 
its legitimacy from uppermost moral-political or jural principles. The ends and 
ethic of a civil state are its own. 
So, in the following four sections, I offer a semiformalized account of civil 
prudence as comprising a jurisprudential ethic for a sovereign state defined by two 
responsibilities: protecting its citizenry from external or internal evils, and 
fostering sociability. 
Supporting these responsibilities are what I see as the four main constituent 
planks or aspects of civil prudence. The first two aspects are about how it 
construes threats to civil life, the second pair with the form and internal structure 
of public authority answering to this problematization. In Part I of the Article I 
show how civil prudence emerged as a contextual-historical problematization of 
pathological combinations of political power, conscientious faith, and philosophy. 
This historicizing aspect of civil prudence is internally related—that is, more than 
merely a propaedeutic—to its ethic of state and, equally crucially, to its rhetoric. 
Secondly, in Part II, we will see how civil prudence nevertheless revolves around 
something of a nonhistorical order: namely, an antiredemptive picture of human 
nature, or a moral anthropology. In the interests of enhancing its pertinence, I outline 
a way of giving the civil prudential image of man a contemporary psychological 
inflection. 
Part III concerns the form of paramount sovereign authority that this tradition 
takes to be a necessary precondition of a civil security state’s having at once the 
capacity and responsibility to protect its citizenry. At a certain point historico-
philosophical reconstruction gives way to some modern instantiations, which 
suggest how this aspect of the tradition persists, often interstitially, in 
contemporary states, including the United States. In Part IV, I pick out the office-
based account of the differentiated jurisdictions and moral personae or mentalities 
associated with the civil prudential form of state; this conception of civil prudence 
as an ethic of office will be crucial to my claim that civil prudence is not a political 
or moral philosophy applicable to all citizens, or rational members of a political 
 
of Thomas Hobbes and Jean Bodin especially, which were historically crucial to shaping the 
“consolidated . . . and concentrated political capacities” of a civil state on which the norms and 
practices we call liberal democracy continue to depend. For Holmes, one of the “common blunders” 
of modern liberal constitutional theory is that the core aim of a constitution is “to secure individual 
liberty by hamstringing the government.” Id. at 101. As a corrective to this emphasis, Holmes shows 
how the sixteenth-century jurist Bodin articulated—long before liberal democracy—the key premise 
of the latter’s insistence on dividing and limiting government: “The less the power of the sovereign is 
(the true marks of majesty thereunto still reserved) the more it is assured.” Id. at 115. The state that 
binds itself through diverse constitutional constraint will be more powerful than one characterized by 
capricious unlimited assertions of sovereign power. Id. at 109. 
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community. Part V concludes the Article by addressing the civil prudential state 
form’s indifference to democracy. If indifference does not entail hostility, what 
sense does the civil prudence model of the state make of democracy? How do 
they get to be grafted onto one another? This Introduction began with leftist 
disgust with the state. My concluding sketch of a civil prudential optic on state-
democracy relations is shadowed by its pre-eminent American conservative 
counterpart. 
I. PRUDENTIA CIVILIS AS HISTORY 
What are the early modern origins of the locution “civil prudence”? To come 
at this question, which right away raises the question of civil prudence’s relation to 
the counter-concepts of moral idealism and political realism, I begin with its 
component of contextual history. According to Gerhard Oestreich, in its 
seventeenth and early eighteenth-century European heyday, the era of early 
modern European monarchical state-building, “prudential civilis . . . . embraced 
the whole area of the training of princes and . . . their advisers, the new 
bureaucracy and, not least, the military.” Civil prudential writing, counsel, and 
teaching prepared its students for an active life of nonsectarian, disciplined, 
authoritarian public service.14 Its ethical component, argues Oestreich, drew 
primarily from seventeenth-century reworkings of Stoicism, most notably by 
Justus Lipsius.15 
Prudentia civilis sits alongside the overlapping generic rubrics of politica, ius 
publicum, civil science, and natural law. But not everything written under these 
rubrics comported with civil prudence. An example is the sacralizing telos of 
Althusius’ Politica, epitomized in his anti-Bodinian conception of the people—
vested with sovereignty—as bound together in a “universal symbiotic 
communion.”16 Conversely, as I will illustrate, historiographical texts written 
under color of civil prudence report themselves as engaged in a quest for objective 
truth. But is it that simple? How might contextual history form part of civil 
prudence as an ethic (and moreover as not the same as neo-stoicism)? 
To my knowledge, the most uncompromising exponent of the ethic of state-
citizen relations I am calling “civil prudence” was the German civilian Samuel 
Pufendorf. Open up his best known treatise of philosophical natural law, the De 
Jure Naturae et Gentium, and you see a medley of genres: eclectic philosophical 
polemic, copious examples drawn from classical auctores, lay anthropological 
observation, Ramus-like juristic classification, and revealed Christian truths.17 
 
14. GERHARD OESTREICH, NEOSTOICISM AND THE EARLY MODERN STATE 162–65 
(Brigitta Oestreich & H.G. Koenigsberger eds., David McLintock trans., 1982).  
15. Id. at 13–75. The discipline of civil prudence was also modified to be of use to non-noble 
parts of the citizenry not involved in politics. Id. at 163.  
16. JOHANNES ALTHUSIUS, POLITICA 73–74 (Frederick S. Carney ed. & trans., Liberty Fund 
1995) (1603). Althusius does make a place, though, for practical political prudence and even pro tem 
toleration of religious difference. Id. at 135–74. 
17. See 2 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO [ON THE 
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What Pufendorf’s natural law writings do not generally deploy are recent historical 
reference-points.18 Nor do these texts make use of the locution “civil prudence.” 
However, that rubric is pivotal to the controversial conclusion to one of his 
most (in)famous historiographical works, known as the Monzambano.19 Underlining 
the want of a dependable locus of sovereignty within the Holy Roman Empire 
haphazardly presiding over the miscellaneous German territories, Pufendorf 
dubbed it a diseased, uniquely “misshapen monster, if it be measured by the 
common rules of politicks and civil prudence.”20 The very commonality of those 
rules cautions against reading too much of Pufendorf’s natural law ethic into this 
formulation. 
For the seventeenth-century exponent of prudentia civilis, Hermann Conring,21 
it was synonymous with politica scienta. Combining a Galenic medical-empirical 
stance with an analytic/synthetic Aristotelian method, prudentia civilis engages in 
objectifying historical and comparative investigations of the “illnesses” afflicting 
political bodies, how they arose (in relation to which interests), and the techniques 
of political domination required to “cure” them. It disclaims a power to predict 
the future, but claims to equip those who master it with “the oracles of prudence” 
needed to govern a commonwealth in a context of antagonistic ecclesiastical 
pluralism.22 So it is not only a science. But is this extra-scientific dimension more 
than an amoral pragmatism? 
We can gather from that interface of knowledge and the office of counsellor 
that if the ethical edge of Pufendorf’s historical writings should not be overstated, 
neither should Conring’s amoral realism.23 Consider his contention that civil 
prudence teaches bearers of governmental responsibility, including historians, how 
 
LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS IN EIGHT BOOKS] (C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans., 
Clarendon Press 1934) (1688).  
18. Compare Hobbes’ brilliant analysis of the unprecedented threat to public peace posed by 
the emergence of reformed churches in THOMAS HOBBES, THE ELEMENTS OF LAW, NATURAL AND 
POLITIC 141–42 (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1994) (1640), with a superb discussion of this 
analysis in Pasquale Pasquino, Political Theory, Order, and Threat, in POLITICAL ORDER 19, 28–32 (Ian 
Shapiro & Russell Hardin eds., 1993).  
19. For bibliographical details, see James Tully, Editor’s Introduction to SAMUEL PUFENDORF, 
ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING TO NATURAL LAW, at xiv–xv (James Tully ed., 
Michael Silverthorne trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1673).  
20. SAMUEL PUFENDORF, THE PRESENT STATE OF GERMANY 176 (Michael J. Seidler ed., 
Edmund Bohun trans., Liberty Fund 2007) (1667) (footnote omitted). “Monzambano” was the 
pseudonym under which Pufendorf originally published it in 1667. Id. at xiii. See also id. at x for the 
idea that historiographical polemic is integral to desacralizing genre of natural law. 
21. For an introduction to the range and fascination of Conring’s work, see Constantin Fasolt, 
Introduction to HERMANN CONRING’S NEW DISCOURSE ON THE ROMAN-GERMAN EMPEROR, at ix–
xxii (Constantin Fasolt ed. & trans., 2005) [hereinafter NEW DISCOURSE]. 
22. See Constantin Fasolt, Political Unity and Religious Diversity: Hermann Conring’s Confessional 
Writings and the Preface to Aristotle’s Politics of 1637, in CONFESSIONALIZATION IN EUROPE, 1555–1700, 
at 319, 333 (John M. Headley et al. eds., 2004). The claim to scientificity regarding “the characteristics 
of bodies politic in and of themselves,” as Conring put it in his Miscellaneous Theses on Civil Prudence, has 
to be understood in its context of a medical discourse heavily laden with moral metaphor. Id. at 332. 
23. Fasolt, supra note 21, at xi. 
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to cultivate a distance from all religious affiliations, including their own, so as to 
live with religious diversity. Confessional belief should be irrelevant to a person’s 
counting as a member of a given political community in good standing. Here 
Conring adumbrates a crucial component of the civil prudential ethic: a capacity 
for a particular kind of official indifference that is a behavioral and policy 
condition of religious neutrality.24 Best discussed in connection with civil 
prudential office, this capacity (known as adiaphorism) is a morally demanding 
ability that has to be cultivated and appropriately performed. 
This performative dimension of civil prudence suggests a way of making a 
non-Habermasian sense of its location “between facts and norms.” Civil 
prudence, I want to say, offers a way of avoiding the critical theoretical 
supposition of a “chasm between ideal-theoretical demands and social facts,” 
which it is then theory’s job to dialectically bridge.25 That way passes through 
rhetoric. After all, Pufendorf and Conring were part of Renaissance rhetoric’s 
greatest pedagogical-institutional support: the humanist movement. Among the 
links between the studia humanitatis curriculum and historical (and philological) 
studies, none were closer than their connections with rhetoric, the standing of 
which the early humanist movement did so much to promote.26 Rhetoric and 
historiography alike were “devoted to concrete, causal and didactic description.” 
Descriptio begins life as a rhetorical category, an exercise in ekphrasis27 in turn linked 
to epideictic, the rhetoric of praise, or disapprobation. It is as rhetorically inflected 
discourse—which is not to say rhetorical through and through—that 
historiography may be lodged inside the ethic of civil prudence.28 
 
24. Fasolt, supra note 22, at 340–41.  
25. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE 
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996) (1992). As Habermas’s 
discussion of Adam Ferguson’s attempt to historicize civil society implies, in Habermas’s book, 
contextual historiography of law and society has to be read as a “non-normative” enterprise in order 
to exemplify the more general loss of normativity in the modern institutional social order that calls for 
a discourse-theoretical reconciliation with terms of moral-political legitimacy. Id. at 44–45. Part of the 
interest of civil prudence’s contextual historical component (with its rhetorical-ethical edge) may lie in 
its divergence from the Kantian dialectical problematic that Habermas reanimates in his search for 
“an account of modern law that is neither sociologically empty nor normatively blind.” William Rehg, 
Translator’s Introduction to HABERMAS, supra, at xxiii. 
26. Donald R. Kelley, Humanism and History, in 3 RENAISSANCE HUMANISM: FOUNDATIONS, 
FORMS, AND LEGACY 236, 236 (Albert Rabil, Jr. ed., 1988). 
27. For a pithy account of ekphrasis and its ethical bias, see MICHAEL BAXANDALL, GIOTTO 
AND THE ORATORS 87–88 (1971).  
28. I am not discounting the difference between, say, Conring’s historical demonstrations of 
the disconnect between the German imposture known as the “Holy Roman Empire” and the 
territory, laws, and rights of the historical Roman Empire, and Desiderius Erasmus’s perfectly 
rhetorical (prosopopeic) polemic of 1517, in which a personified Peace complains of how Christian 
princes, nobles, commoners, scholars, and priests alike reject him in favor of infernal strife and 
destruction. DESIDERIUS ERASMUS, A Complaint of Peace, in THE ERASMUS READER 288, 288–314 
(Erika Rummel ed., 1990) (“[I]n the name of immortal God I must say this: who would believe those 
beings to be human . . . when they devote so much expenditure and application . . . to rid themselves 
of me . . . ? What Fury from hell could have implanted this poison in a Christian heart?”). 
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Between an ethic of civil peace that avows its connections to rhetoric via arts 
of describing, and civil prudence-as-history, sits the ancient rhetorical device of 
paradiastole. Thomas Hobbes was preoccupied with its political dangerousness. As 
taught by ancient Roman rhetoricians, paradiastole consists, in Quentin Skinner’s 
formulation, of “morally redescribing” people, actions or situations, so as to raise 
or lower public estimations of them (though it lends itself to other ethical 
purposes).29 Do you deem an action courageous or reckless, cautious or timid? 
Think of how normativity, facticity and controversy mesh in Pufendorf’s 
characterization of the Holy Roman Empire as a “misshapen monster.” 
As Aristotle explained, paradiastole was built into the grammar of talk about 
virtues and vices. It remains a feature of all discursive ethical conflict. A deficiency 
of courage (cowardice) is usually unmistakable. However, between a courageous 
act and its “excessive” correlate (recklessness), there is room for both informative 
or erroneous, and good or bad faith judgment.30 The modern fate of moral 
redescription is to have become either ignored or else ignominious. Where it is 
noticed, as in political discourse, it is typically identified with duplicitous spin.31 In 
fact that identification is itself an example of using paradiastole in bad faith, or at 
least thoughtlessly. The same is true of Kant’s use of paradiastole to deprecate “the 
doctrine of prudence” in politics, by arbitrarily limiting its semantic reference to 
the pursuit of selfish advantage.32 His covert use of rhetoric to purify moral 
discourse of contamination by civil/sociable dispositions is part of the story of 
how statist prudence lost its ethical coloration, as it came to be identified with its 
amoral-realist dimension.33 This is why part of the work of repurposing the ethic 
of civil prudence involves affirming its character as a historical deployment of 
rhetoric. 
While contextual history can serve various purposes, it may have a special 
affinity with civil prudence. John Pocock has argued that contextual history, 
considered as a genre, emerged in Western Christendom as a competitor to sacred 
philosophical history. This was centered around God’s actions in the world he 
created, those of his Son, and the role of outpourings of the Holy Spirit embodied 
 
29. On these “techniques of re-description,” see QUENTIN SKINNER, REASON AND 
RHETORIC IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBES 138–80 (1996). Skinner makes no mention of a non-
agonistic classical use of the device as a means of charitable and tactful interpretation of conduct. Id. 
For an example of this formulation of paradiastole, see THE COMPLETE ODES AND SATIRES OF 
HORACE 204–05 (Sidney Alexander trans., 1999) (“Hot-headed is he? Let him be accounted a man of 
spirit.”) Tactful redescriptions are surely indispensible to political negotiation.  
30. See THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE 28–47 (David Ross trans., Oxford Univ. 
Press 1963) (1925).  
31. For a widely read discussion of framing, which is unaware of its origins in the classical art 
of rhetoric, but which does not assume that spin is necessarily duplicitous, see GEORGE LAKOFF, 
MORAL POLITICS: HOW LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK (2d ed. 2002).  
32. See IMMANUEL KANT, TOWARD PERPETUAL PEACE (1795), reprinted in PRACTICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 317, 338 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., 1996). 
33. See id. at 338–47. On Kant’s intellectual purification of the ethical, see IAN HUNTER, 
RIVAL ENLIGHTENMENTS: CIVIL AND METAPHYSICAL PHILOSOPHY IN EARLY MODERN 
GERMANY 274–315 (2001). 
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in communities, prophets, and martyrs in building on that action.34 Ian Hunter’s 
genealogies illustrate both sides of this sacralizing/de-sacralizing divide. He has 
tracked the secular afterlife of sacralizing histories in critical philosophy, “theory,” 
and some legal histories, where a theoretical sense of history is expressed in 
narratives built around the surfacing—incarnations—of universal ideals of justice 
in “breakthrough” moments.35 
On the side of contextual history, Hunter’s accounts of Pufendorf’s greatest 
follower, Christian Thomasius, trace the importance, for his program for 
reforming philosophy, of “histories of morality.”36 These were built around 
accounts of competing philosophical schools, their pedagogies and sectarian 
cultural-political impacts.37 Thomasius’s moral redescriptions of Platonism in such 
terms trace their ruinous effects on Christian theology and civil government, from 
Roman imperial times to the era of confessionalization. Thomasius does not hide 
the ethico-rhetorical implications of his history, in which philosophical error about 
the meaning of “substance” could issue in anathemas: “[M]yriads of men have 
been butchered and banished not for God’s sake, but for the sake of . . . Plato’s 
metaphysics. Nonetheless, this paradox is only too true.”38 The Platonic 
assumption that moral phenomena were possessed of an intrinsic nature to which 
a suitably philosophically and spiritually formed metaphysician could accede was 
no innocent seminar topic when it got to be built into confessional politics. 
Thomasius here enunciates explicitly a part of the contextual-historical 
problem, in part a problem of the comportment of the personnel of the 
confessionalizing state, which Pufendorf had previously addressed in what 
scholars blandly term his “demarcation argument” about the scope of natural law. 
Let us see how it lends further support to my claims that contextual history is an 
intrinsic part of the ethic of civil prudence, and that civil prudence is best regarded 
as less a moral philosophy than a jurisprudential doctrine and its accompanying 
disciplined demeanor. 
Like an opening salvo in a battle, the preface to his primer on natural law 
begins with a drastic proposal for reforming natural law. Pufendorf attempts, by 
way of a definitional fiat, to entirely exclude the “moral theology” habitually 
taught in philosophy faculties from playing its accustomed role in the composition 
 
34. J.G.A. Pocock, Historiography as a Form of Political Thought, 37 HIST. EUR. IDEAS 1, 3 (2011).  
35. See Shaunnagh Dorsett & Ian Hunger, Introduction, in LAW AND POLITICS IN BRITISH 
COLONIAL THOUGHT: TRANSPOSITIONS OF EMPIRE 1, 1–7 (Shaunnagh Dorsett & Ian Hunter eds., 
2010); Ian Hunter, Global Justice and Regional Metaphysics, in LAW AND POLITICS IN BRITISH COLONIAL 
THOUGHT, supra, at 11, 11–25; Ian Hunter, The History of Theory, 33 CRITICAL INQUIRY 78, 108–111 
(2006).  
36. See HUNTER, supra note 12 (describing how Thomasius would explicate metaphysical 
principles by tracing their historical origins). 
37. On this genre, see T.J. HOCHSTRASSER, NATURAL LAW THEORIES IN THE EARLY 
ENLIGHTENMENT 11–30 (2000). On Thomasius’s (and his father’s) historiographical onslaught on 
confessionalist intellectual culture, see HUNTER, supra note 12, at 54–73. 
38. CHRISTIAN THOMASIUS, ON THE RIGHT OF PROTESTANT PRINCES REGARDING 
HERETICS (1697), reprinted in HUNTER, supra note 12, § 28, at 178.  
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and teaching of natural law, and hence in the formation of governmental policies 
and personnel. Moral theology’s business is confined to spiritual guidance of 
Christians based less on metaphysical subtleties than on Biblical revelation. 
Concern with the ends of civil government and the duties of citizens to the state 
should rest with natural lawyers (located in law faculties). In turn, natural law must 
not impose on the spiritual welfare of citizens. Natural law’s jurisdiction “is 
confined within the orbit of this life . . . form[ing] men to conduct themselves 
more sociably with others.”39 
The obverse of his demarcation of moral theology and natural law was no 
less controversial: a reduction of the distance between natural law and positive 
law-government.40 The former can function as a source of internal normative 
pressure on the latter. Yet this is not to say that natural law concerns the law as it 
ought to be, as distinct from what it actually says or does. Both are yoked to the 
same normative end: civil peace and sociality. Moreover, civil prudential natural 
law is distinguished from positive law by its greater generality rather than by its 
location above and beyond it. For instance, a state’s statutory taking or 
disgorgement of citizens’ assets, through eminent domain or civil forfeiture 
proceedings, could be said to particularize a natural-law-based sovereign 
prerogative (“radical title”) over national assets.41 
Pufendorf’s twofold demarcation cut through the intellectual continuum 
between spiritual-philosophical and secular-political concerns that had long been 
inseparable from Christian natural law as a university discipline, and which vested 
natural law with responsibility for setting the moral-spiritual standards and 
policing the boundaries of “the two cities.” It is in large part the civil-prudential 
jurisprudes’ contextual historical antennae that drive their sense of the problem 
posed by this continuum. The result of the way the schism in Christendom played 
out was an irrepressible plurality of churches. Coupled with the newfound 
capabilities of centralizing states, the continuum—subjecting political rule to the 
imperatives of spiritual truth—became a charter for endless, devastating, and 
savage religious warfare, as states imposing confessional uniformity provoked 
internal popular insurgency and foreign invasions in defense of persecuted co-
religionists. As Thomasius’s polemic underlines, metaphysically honed theologies 
worked to intensify confessions’ identities and inclination to hereticize rival faiths. 
The solution to this situation, as one of the greatest contemporary civil prudential 
historians, Martin Heckel, has shown, was a straight and narrow form of 
secularization in the form of limited juridifications of church-state jurisdictional 
and property relations.42 The imperfect realization of the civil prudential program 
 
39. See PUFENDORF, supra note 19, at 8–9.  
40. David Saunders, ‘Within the Orbit of This Life’—Samuel Pufendorf and the Autonomy of Law, 23 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2173, 2181 (2002).  
41. See Jeffrey Minson, Civil Prudence, Sovereignty and Citizenship in the Justification of Civil Forfeiture, 
29 U.N.S.W. L.J. 61, 83–84 (2006) (describing Pufendorf’s interest in eminent domain).  
42. For an account of Martin Heckel’s research project and its wider implications, see 
HUNTER, supra note 33, at 13–14, 81–84. 
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of de-sacralization alluded to in the Introduction above was not by reference to a 
general ideal or society-wide developmental process of secularization. 
Can fact and norm be separated out here? In Thomasius’s eyes, the 
metaphysical moral theologians had blood on their hands, to marginalize them 
was amply justified. But he knows this on the basis of a type of historical-political 
problematization. Thomasius’s treatment of metaphysical philosophies not as 
competitors in a philosophical game of truth, but as historical objects (e.g., as 
schools) is not simply a methodological choice but part of an ethical stance. This 
is why it is inappropriate to see Pufendorf and Thomasius as competing in the 
same space as metaphysical philosophers. For the former, descriptive-historical 
studies are not, as they are for Kant (and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel too), 
merely empirical preliminaries to asking properly normative moral philosophical 
questions, but rather freighted with ethical significance.43 They disclose that the 
pursuit of ultimate truths is deadly when allied to politics and religion. Contextual 
history is here a rhetorical carrier of the civil prudential ethic.  
II. MORAL ANTHROPOLOGY 
“One could test all theories of state . . . according to their anthropology and 
thereby classify these as to whether they consciously or unconsciously presuppose 
man to be . . . . [A] dangerous being or not, a risky or a harmless creature.”44 
If not all history is contextual, so too not all context is historical. In 
Pufendorf’s bleak conjectural history of man in the natural state and the resulting 
“impulsive cause of constituting a state,”45 he lays out a largely mythopoeic moral 
anthropology.46 Why should anyone versed in the social-scientific tilt toward de-
naturalizing human conduct take it seriously? 
One answer is, to parse the above quotation from Carl Schmitt, that all 
political argument is modulated, at least tacitly, by a representation of what human 
beings are perennially like. To capture the complexity of the genre we need to 
underline that their objects are human characteristics expressed not only as 
individual motives, but in human interactions. Following Schmitt again, human 
nature is manifest, not only in “associations and disassociations,” but also in social 
 
43. See CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, THE SOURCES OF NORMATIVITY 7–48 (Onora O’Neill 
ed., 1996) (providing an example of what Kantians take to be the inescapable normative question, and 
treating Pufendorf as a foil).  
44. CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 58 (George Schwab et al. trans., Univ. 
of Chi. Press expanded ed. 2007) (1932).  
45. PUFENDORF, supra note 19, at 33–35, 115–19, 132–34; see also SAMUEL PUFENDORF’S ON 
THE NATURAL STATE OF MEN: THE 1678 LATIN EDITION AND ENGLISH TRANSLATION 111 
(Michael Seidler trans., 1990) [hereinafter PUFENDORF, NATURAL STATE] (describing a natural state 
of man that is not perfect but built on “a human nature tinged with depravity”). 
46. Its mythopoeic quality is illustrated in Pufendorf’s speculation that “the first humans, 
upon being expelled from Paradise . . . by means of God’s special grace and instruction . . . [quickly] 
learned . . . how to use the things most important for meeting the needs of human life,” such as how 
to make clothing. PUFENDORF, NATURAL STATE, supra note 45, at 115. 
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“distance[s].”47 Further, a jostling range of human dispositions are typically 
portrayed, distributed within or across individuals, and located in a social setting—
a “state of nature” that conjured up experiences or memories of life amid 
destructive and deadly chaos. 
These ramifications undercut negative associations of human nature talk with 
one-dimensional generalizations claiming to be predictive of political behavior. 
Rather, think of a moral anthropology as a “speaking picture,”48 an historico-
rhetorical artifact. Look for how it mobilizes a cast of characters with their 
dispositions and equipment (e.g., forms of calculating); a social stage with its 
groups, zones and locales, furnishings, moral and power relations; a plot; an 
audience (or inscribed reader).49 
The element of human dangerousness that for Schmitt was the touchstone 
of political theoretical seriousness is a big part of Pufendorf’s moral anthropology 
but does not suffice to capture what is special about it, what is apposite to the 
political and intellectual culture in which it was intervening, and what is worthy of 
attention today. 
Pufendorf’s men are malicious and often violently aggressive, overly prone 
to take offense. They are variable in their passions and aspirations, which readily 
clash. They are creatures of lack from birth to the grave—dependent on others for 
care, love, protection, and benefits. Human sociability is partly a matter of 
enlightened self-interest—“to be safe, it is necessary . . . to be sociable”—but not 
entirely.50 Pufendorf acknowledges some people’s naturally sociable, sympathetic, 
or altruistic inclinations; and stipulates that men must do their utmost to promote 
and preserve sociality—in other words, more than a purely self-interested negative 
duty of not harming others would entail.51 The problem is that men are dangerous 
both to themselves and others to an extent that cannot be dependably offset by 
their sociable and friendly tendencies.52 Fear of insecurity is the impulsion that 
leads men to acquiesce in or install a state. 
Still less—and here we are reminded of the mistrust of the metaphysical 
disposition behind his demarcation argument—can humans depend for collective 
order on their rational dispositions. Moral dispositions are all too prone to 
malicious or aggressive overreach. Following the classical Epicureans, Pufendorf 
 
47. SCHMITT, supra note 44, at 60.  
48. DAVID JOHNSTON, THE RHETORIC OF LEVIATHAN: THOMAS HOBBES AND THE 
POLITICS OF CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION 66 (1986) (discussing Hobbes’s shift, in the words of a 
chapter subtitle, “[f]rom [d]ry [d]iscourse to [s]peaking [p]icture”). 
49. A debt must be acknowledged here to ABRAHAM EDEL, METHOD IN ETHICAL THEORY 
21–22 (1963)—an unusual attempt to develop categories for comparative description of moral 
philosophies.  
50. PUFENDORF, supra note 19, at 35.  
51. Id. In Pufendorf’s book, the obligation to promote sociality is “absolute” where its 
concomitant officiae of not harming others’ lives and acquisitions is again irreducible to terms of self-
interest or private property. Id. at 56. 
52. PUFENDORF, NATURAL STATE, supra note 45, at 130 (suggesting that men in their natural 
state had to act “as if the friendship of others were little to be relied on”).  
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casts repeated doubt on the efficacy of philosophical reasoning—including 
utilitarianism—as affording an antidote to human unsociability, or a transcendent 
rational foundation for natural law.53 In questions of politics, most people—and 
he is not talking about the masses—forever remain children.54 He is not 
supposing that people are always malicious or politically childish, or that they 
cannot acquire civic capacities through education or training. Once again it is a 
question of dependability, but also of rejecting Aristotle’s image of humans as 
fitted for politics by nature. Without effective paramount institutions of public 
authority it only takes some who refuse to restrain their greed, ambition, or moral 
zeal in order to force even the most reasonable and good-natured into defending 
themselves and hence perpetuating violent disorder. 
It is partly philosophical rationalism’s redemptive aspect that leads Pufendorf 
to repudiate it as part of his organized evacuation from conventional Christian 
natural law via his demarcation between our Christian and natural law personae. It 
is proper, he argues, in our capacity as Christians to live in hope of redemption. 
Spiritual redemption was epitomized in the Augustinian homo duplex image of man 
as sinful, fallen, wretched, yet also as bearing traces (notably rationality) of their 
having been born in God’s image, therefore as redeemable. For purposes of 
government, argues Pufendorf, “since natural law does not extend where reason 
cannot reach, it would be inappropriate to try to deduce natural law from the 
uncorrupted nature of man.”55 Speculation about humanity’s prelapsarian 
integrity, or capacity for redemption, should not serve as a model to which civil 
laws and customs must be conformed. Rather, and startlingly, “states are a sort of 
remedy for human imperfection . . . we [natural lawyers and state office holders] 
will always presuppose a human nature tinged with depravity.”56 This coup against 
the sacred-secular continuum (in politics) is his moral-anthropology’s most 
radically de-transcendentalizing gesture. 
But can this desacralizing image of the person be sustained in our time? 
Distinguishing between two intertwined obstacles to its plausibility—the 
metaphysics of autonomy and psychological ways of making our lives 
intelligible—points to how the civil prudential anthropology might be extended. 
There is no doubting the moral authority and broad distribution of 
metaphysical images of the free self-governing citizen (or community)—as 
rationally self-consistent, creative, role- and rule-transcending, self-realizing, and 
values-expressing. It is apparent that moral anthropologies of civil prudence and 
metaphysics of autonomy are polar opposites. Recall Kant’s attack on political 
prudence, which he personifies as the exclusively opportunistic “political 
 
53. On Pufendorf’s skepticism about utility as a general principle of natural law, see HUNTER, 
supra note 33, at 179.  
54. See 2 PUFENDORF, supra note 17, at 952.  
55. PUFENDORF, supra note 19, at 10. 
56. PUFENDORF, NATURAL STATE, supra note 45, at 111.  
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moralist.”57 For Kant, it is unthinkable that a political actor can qualify as moral—
as true to his essence as a free intelligent being, as is the “moral politician”—
without conducting himself in relation to an ideal moral horizon.58 The moral 
anthropology of civil prudence, with its emphasis on un-transcendable human lack 
and dangerousness, presents an opposite case. Those tasked with responsibilities 
of government must learn how to think ethically and to govern without ideals, 
partly to protect themselves from their own impulses as well as those they attempt 
to govern. But must civil prudence, self-constrained “to mould[ing] men’s external 
conduct to propriety”59 not equally be at odds with psychological perspectives on 
matters of government? 
In some senses it must. There is reason to be grateful where sovereign state 
laws still distinguish sin or moral fecklessness from crime, or rule political, moral, 
or religious intent, or knowledges of individuals’ psychological singularities, non-
dispositive in determining criminal guilt or a drunk driving conviction. However, 
only to a degree have these lines of demarcation been maintained. In the era of the 
social state, the empire of psychological power-knowledges extends into the 
administration of law and order.60 A politico-moral anthropology that makes no 
concessions to presumptions of psychological complexity in contemporary 
(ap)perceptions of personhood may appear too thin, and to be giving up ground. 
For so many psychological knowledges seek to render the metaphysical ethos of 
autonomy technically operative in tactics of “governing through freedom.” 
This is a reason for recalibrating civil prudence’s relation to the psychological 
domain. Not all understandings of it rest on metaphysical understandings of the 
morally autonomous person. It follows that one way to enhance the plausibility of 
civil prudence’s moral anthropology is to assemble contemporary de-
transcendentalizing counter-images of the person that are located on this 
psychological register. 
This is not the place to canvas the range of potential sources of these 
“counter-images,” from psychoanalysis to studies of the amygdala. Let me call 
attention to just one such source. Little known in the Anglophone world, François 
Flahaut continues to develop his extraordinary project for a “general 
anthropology.” Deploying an eclectic array of arguments and methods, Flahault 
attempts to subject contemporary ultramundane ethical, socio-political and 
spiritual discourse to what he dubs a “de-idealizing cure,” by assembling a cross-
cultural array of non-redemptive depictions and experiences of the human 
condition.61 
 
57. KANT, supra note 32, at 340. 
58. Id. 
59. PUFENDORF, supra note 19, at 9. 
60. See NIKOLAS ROSE, GOVERNING THE SOUL: THE SHAPING OF THE PRIVATE SELF, at 
xxi–xxii, 4–7 (2d ed. 1999) (describing how the “psy” sciences “have provided the means whereby 
human subjectivity and intersubjectivity could enter the calculations of the authorities”). 
61. See FRANÇOIS FLAHAULT, LE SENTIMENT D’EXISTER 32–33 (2002); François Flahault, 
The Sense of Existing, SALMAGUNDI, Fall 1994–Winter 1995, at 248 (his sole article in English). For a 
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Among many ways in which his work resonates with civil prudence, here is 
an (inadvertent) echo of Pufendorf’s way of displacing the Augustinian image of 
humans as fallen-but-redeemable. In a work dedicated to investigating the inter-
subjective yet irreducibly psychological springs of malice, Flahault notices the 
lacuna left by secular-enlightened critiques of Augustinian accounts of human 
nature. Fixated on rejecting guilt-mongering myths of original sin, critiques of 
Judaeo-Christian fall narratives left unchallenged its notions of redemption and 
Adamic innocence. Whence an abiding Achilles’ heel of progressive thought: 
humans are naturally good, but corrupted or stultified by evils rooted in 
oppressive social relations. Flahault counters this image with a picture of the 
psyche as naturally disposed to evil and beneficence: “as being ambivalent by 
nature, not because of a fall, an evil by which it has become contaminated”—or 
from which it can be liberated.62 
Not because of a fall: for sure, Pufendorf speaks of fallen man. But Flahault 
brings out the extra-lapsarian logic of Pufendorf’s image of man as “always . . . 
tinged with depravity.” Flahault’s image of humanity’s condition itself retains a 
homo duplex structure, yet its terms are no longer as in the Christian version morally 
asymmetrical.63 Rather, the psyche’s ambivalence is structured by tension between 
two qualities, both of which are invaluable to us and may be dangerous, self-
disruptive, or frustrating—a tension that can at best be managed. A propensity to 
“illimitable” self-assertion—in a Promethean rather than egoistic or self-interested 
sense—has to contend with human beings’ dependencies on other people for all 
the usual things and also on familiar milieus (houses, or places that feel at home) 
and possessions (owned, shared, circulated). Out of that internal friction arise 
human beings’ malicious propensities, which (paralleling Nietzsche and Freud) 
have a way of latching onto moral dispositions.64 
 
fuller account of Flahault, see Jeffrey Minson, The Sense of Existing and Its Political Implications (on François 
Flahault’s “General Anthropology”), in STATE, SECURITY, AND SUBJECT FORMATION 157, 157–71 (Anna 
Yeatman & Magdalena Zolkos eds., 2010). For an exceptional use of Flahault’s analysis of 
Promethean self-images to illuminate the inter-subjective dimensions of the financial world, see 
Grahame F. Thompson, The Global Regulatory Consequences of an Irrational Crisis: Examining ‘Animal 
Spirits’ and ‘Excessive Exuberances,’ 7 GLOBALIZATIONS 87, 95–97 (2010).  
62. See FRANÇOIS FLAHAULT, MALICE 27 (Liz Heron trans., Verso 2003) (1998) [hereinafter 
FLAHAULT, MALICE]. Chantal Mouffe’s introduction to this English edition repays study. See id. at 1–
15. One aspect of Flahault’s work of particular relevance to the theme of (dis)enchantment is his 
attention to the role of atheistic (semi-Promethean) spirituality in modern idealizing social and 
political thought. For a recent example of this, see FRANÇOIS FLAHAULT, LE CRÉPUSCULE DE 
PROMÉTHÉE: CONTRIBUTION À UNE HISTOIRE DE LA DÉMESURE HUMAINE 39 (2008), noting that 
contemporary Promethean self-assertion is characterized by “a tragic and sad breach” (author’s 
translation) of the classical images of Prometheus as a hubristic figure, a figure of emancipation and 
unlimited self-assertion destined for destruction, in favor of an unambivalent Christianized figure of 
illimitable liberation, progress, and justice. 
63. See FLAHAULT, MALICE, supra note 62, passim. His ability to circumvent both Augustinian-
Christian and secular-progressive conceptions of the sources of malice shows how readily Pufendorf’s 
de-transcendentalizing image of the person can be bumped into a nontheological register—one 
reason why his theological commitments may not be an obstacle to renewing this ethic. See id. 
64. Id. As to why illimitable self-assertion is not synonymous with egoism or selfishness, see 
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Pufendorf characterized sovereign statehood as “a sort of remedy for human 
imperfection.”65 We will have occasion in what follows to illustrate some of the 
psychological twists that human imperfection can take in politics and government. 
III. THE CIVIL SOVEREIGN 
Pufendorf’s conception of sovereign statehood has many 
literary/philosophical sources, including a critical engagement with Hobbes. But 
to understand how this conception short-circuits moral and political philosophical 
approaches, we need to learn from scholars who have focused on the way, always 
implicitly, the De Jure Naturae is about formalizing and drawing lessons from the 
1648 Westphalian Peace settlements, especially the instituting of toleration for the 
Lutheran, Calvinist, and Catholic churches.66 Without breaking with the past, the 
settlement inaugurated a patchwork of political entities, arrangements and citizen 
statuses, some of which—including states in a modern sense—were new. 
David Boucher demonstrates Pufendorf’s appreciation that certain features 
of this nascent juristic reordering outstripped the descriptive capabilities of 
existing languages of politics. In the current political-legal lexicon for classifying 
political or institutional entities a prominent place was occupied, inter alia, by two 
problematic Roman law-based keywords: namely, societas and universitas. The 
former implies a contract between individuals, leaving no space for any notion of 
a state’s corporate legal personality, independently of power-holders at any given 
time. The problem with universitas was that, while it conferred a transferable legal 
personality, it also implied dependence on a superior conferring authority.67 It is 
indicative of the distance between Pufendorf and political philosophical 
approaches to conceptualizing public authority that, as Boucher observes, 
Pufendorf does not pause to argue the inadequacies of societas and universitas but 
rather quietly “abandon[s]” them, focusing instead on amending Hobbes’ 
perspective on the persona, rights, and responsibilities of a sovereign 
“commonwealth” or civitas.68 
Even where Pufendorf is in the business of offering reasons, the style of 
argument clashes with that of rationalist philosophies. Among the “just reasons” 
adduced by Pufendorf for citizens to comply with sovereign authority is that a 
 
FLAHAULT, LE SENTIMENT D’EXISTER, supra note 61, at 509 (citing a comment by Hanna Arendt). 
Egoism implies a tendency to use others, not a desire to annihilate them. Id. 
65. PUFENDORF, NATURAL STATE, supra note 45, at 111.  
66. See Saunders, supra note 40, at 2173–98.  
67. See David Boucher, Resurrecting Pufendorf and Capturing the Westphalian Moment, 27 REV. INT’L 
STUD. 557, 566 (2001). See also MARTIN LOUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 160–63 (2010), 
which redeploys precisely the civilian categories of societas and universitas (as reinterpreted by 
Oakeshott) to capture the bifocal character of modern civil government. Loughlin does not note 
Pufendorf’s expunging of these categories, which he (Loughlin) introduces as part of his dialectical 
undertaking to preserve Pufendorfian sovereignty theory while supplementing its perceived 
limitations. Id.  
68. Boucher, supra note 67, at 565–66. 
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civil state is in a position to protect and otherwise benefit them. From the camp of 
rationalist philosophy, Gottfried Leibniz famously objected that Pufendorf was 
conflating amoral political power (capacity to protect) and the moral force of 
reasons (which found the sovereign’s obligations independently of his will and 
power).69 Pufendorf does run reasons for acting and power to act together, but 
whether that is a problem depends on which style of argument one is engaged in. 
If we are in pursuit of a transcendentally rational justification for sovereign 
authority then Pufendorf’s reasoning seems vulnerable. But if, as Martti 
Koskenniemi puts it, Pufendorf’s inventory of just reasons is internal to a “science 
of government,” Leibniz’s objection cuts no ice. The commands of a superior are 
obligatory for citizens only for as long as a civil government’s “techniques of 
peace, security, welfare” are more or less effectively in play. Absent those state 
capacities, once “the link between protection and obedience is broken. . . . The 
sovereign ceases to be such as a simple rational conclusion from his failure to 
govern properly,” and the obligations of citizens cease. 70 
For a state’s obligations and prerogatives regarding oversight of the common 
safety are worthless unless it can enforce its will. While the sovereign autonomy 
constructed in 1648 presupposes legal recognition by other political entities, it 
cannot be inferred that sovereignty depends on international and internal juridical 
recognition alone.71 A legally recognized state, Pakistan, lacks the capacity or will 
to control part of its territory from which attacks on its neighbor Afghanistan are 
mounted. Therefore, from a civil prudential perspective, Pakistan has no ethical or 
public law claim on the latter to respect its sovereign jurisdiction over those areas 
(the wisdom of counter-attacks may be questioned but not on the grounds of 
Pakistan’s rights of sovereignty). So in state-based reasoning, power and moral 
obligation have to be run together. However, the civil state’s immanent 
responsibility to protect its population remains: It is not an amoral power-state. 
In Pufendorf’s doctrine the composite moral person that is the state is 
separate from the ruled and from those who staff the complex of inter-related yet 
jurisdictionally distinct offices comprising the state. So conceived, the sovereignty 
of a civitas is defined as paramount yet circumscribed. It can be characterized not 
 
69. For lucid accounts of the Pufendorf-Leibniz clash that defend Pufendorf against Leibniz’s 
charges of inconsistency and confusion, see HUNTER, supra note 33, at 143–46, and HOCHSTRASSER, 
supra note 37, at 79–81. 
70. Martti Koskenniemi, Miserable Comforters: International Relations as New Natural Law, 15 EUR. 
J. INT’L REL. 395, 400–03 (2009). 
71. See ERSUN N. KURTULUS, STATE SOVEREIGNTY: CONCEPT, PHENOMENON AND 
RAMIFICATIONS 95–128 (2005), on the limits of the so-called “constitutivist” perspective that 
construes the authority of state sovereignty essentially as effects of legal recognition. For instance, 
Kurtulus cites one commentator’s argument that the authority of a sovereign state regarding its 
exclusionary territorial rights “presupposes the recognition of [other sovereign states] who, per force 
of their recognition, agree to be so excluded.” Id. at 95. For Kurtulus, state sovereignty is an amalgam 
of juridical recognition and “factual” capabilities for civil government. Id. at 129–183. See also 
LOUGHLIN, supra note 67, at 216–21, for a discussion of the re-articulation of Pufendorf’s force-and-
reasons view in Georg Jellinek’s concept of “[t]he [n]ormative [p]ower of the [f]actual.”  
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as omni-competent power but rather by a refusal to recognize a superior or even 
(a Bodinian touch) equal authority.72 All power, however “absolute,” is limited by 
its means. “[M]y orders would not be carried out,” explained the Russian despot 
Catherine the Great, “unless they were the kind of orders which could be carried 
out . . . .” (i.e., if not based on knowledgeable advice and “adapted to the customs, 
to the opinion of the people”).73 Paramount power does not imply an omnipotent 
state, which must then be subject to limits constructed through non-statist 
normative thinking, limits seen as subtracting from or dividing absolute 
sovereignty power.74 You do not begin with a general concept of a power-state. 
Pufendorf’s way of conceptualizing the establishment of the sovereign office—
two pacts followed by a decree—makes it a secondary question as to whether the 
sovereign jurisdictional authority constituted in the initial pact is a monarch or an 
elected body. Pufendorf favors monarchy, but an election is another “form of 
securing sovereignty”: both have disadvantages.75 
A notable characteristic of state sovereignty so defined has been identified by 
Raymond Geuss.76 Recall the leading characteristics of a model contemporary 
polity—that it respects its citizens’ rights, permits free enterprise, political 
officeholders are subject to election, and that nevertheless, a sovereign and at 
times coercive political authority can be exercised. Geuss joins other historically 
minded philosophers and intellectual historians in pursuing the consequences of 
the fact that modern states’ civil powers and constraints emerged prior to and 
independently of their liberal, human rights-based or democratic characteristics.77 
Modern states, democracies or not, remain “non-voluntary” associations (apropos 
taxation, currency, prohibition of popular justice).78 Citizens enjoy rights against 
the state; however, while in civic activist and some theoretical minds they function 
as a “counter-law,” it also stubbornly remains true these are conferred (and the 
 
72. Contra JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY: FOUR CHAPTERS FROM THE SIX BOOKS OF 
THE COMMONWEALTH 59 (Julian H. Franklin ed. & trans., 1992) (noting that, for a sovereign, even 
“to have a companion is to have a master . . . without whose support and consent he can . . . do 
nothing”). 
73. ISABEL DE MADARIAGA, RUSSIA IN THE AGE OF CATHERINE THE GREAT 580 (1981) 
(citing a letter from a relative reporting Catherine’s observations (during a private discussion) on her 
“unlimited power”—a great comment on authority even if not the whole truth about the basis of her 
own).  
74. See KURTULUS, supra note 71, at 78–82.  
75. 2 PUFENDORF, supra note 17, at 1006; see also id. at 1023–33.  
76. See generally RAYMOND GEUSS, HISTORY AND ILLUSION IN POLITICS (2001).  
77. See, e.g., REINHART KOSELLECK, CRITIQUE AND CRISIS: ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE 
PATHOGENESIS OF MODERN SOCIETY (Berg Publishers Ltd. 1988) (1959); BLANDINE KRIEGEL, 
THE STATE AND THE RULE OF LAW (Marc A. LePain & Jeffrey C. Cohen trans., Princeton Univ. 
Press 1995) (1989). For a lucid sympathetic Anglophone account of Koselleck’s argument and its 
implications as a genealogy of theoretical critique, see SAUNDERS, supra note 2, passim.  
78. GEUSS, supra note 76, at 3, 29, 50, 64–68, 86–87. Geuss will not accord “full” normative 
standing to the state’s structure of offices on the ground that, although more than a power state, it 
will not withstand “independent” philosophical evaluation. Id. at 41–42.  
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attendant “costs of rights”79 borne) by the state itself, and citizen status also 
includes a legitimate modicum of subordination. In Pufendorf’s language, the state 
is for limited purposes a superior, albeit not conceived as a superior moral person, 
whom citizens are obliged to love. 
It is worth asking naively why such subordination so often provokes a 
disgusted state-skepticism. One answer lies in an non-theoretical libertarian sensus 
communis as manifested in Whig national histories that portray the historical 
development of the English “nation” as the unfolding or blocking of a pre-
Norman spirit of liberty. To this fairy tale, Hume’s bestselling History of England 
offered a series of civil prudential counter-images, in the form of a disenchanted 
account of the English state’s political development. The reader encounters a 
discontinuous succession of improvisations, “divergent and conflicting practices” in 
successive “series of constitutions,” some in response to social and economic 
processes that governments attempt to coordinate around.80 Some reigns, like that 
of Elizabeth I, suppress liberties but are not pilloried on that account. Hume 
suggests that the English state—to which, he insists, “liberty, though a laudable 
passion, ought commonly to be subordinate”81—has been on balance a producer 
of liberties and the conditions of sustaining them. In a moment we will open up 
one of those counter-images, but first let me invoke two further grounds for self-
dissociation from the limited non-voluntariness entailed by the civil state. 
The first of these stem from an equivalence posited in the metaphysical 
accounts of self-government. Citizens’ rights equate to entitlements of free 
rational agents everywhere, and hence to non-subjection in general. In Etienne 
Balibar’s succinct formulation: “Citizenship is not one among the attributes of 
subjectivity, on the contrary: it is subjectivity, that form of subjectivity that would 
no longer be identical with subjection for anyone.”82 Together this equivalence 
renders any form of subjection (or instrumentalization) of citizens open to being 
morally redescribed as a condition of servility.83 It underpins the tendency to 
conceive the state, in Blandine Kriegel’s words, as an immutable identity such that 
“the most extreme and oppressive forms of power [express] the quintessence of 
the state.”84 
But is there a more empirical reason for the unpalatability of this subordinate 
 
79. See STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY 
DEPENDS ON TAXES (1999).  
80. Eugene F. Miller, Hume on Liberty in the Successive English Constitutions, in LIBERTY IN 
HUME’S HISTORY OF ENGLAND 53, 56–57 (Nicholas Capaldi & Donald W. Livingston eds., 1990). 
For a reading of Hume’s history of England as in part an analysis and exemplification of the 
coordinating role of the state, see ANDREW SABL, HUME’S POLITICS: COORDINATION AND CRISIS IN 
THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND (2012).  
81. 6 DAVID HUME, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND: FROM THE INVASION OF JULIUS CAESAR 
TO THE REVOLUTION IN 1688, at 533 (LibertyClassics 1983) (1778).  
82. Etienne Balibar, Subjection and Subjectivation, in SUPPOSING THE SUBJECT 1, 7–8, 12 (Joan 
Copjec ed., 1994).  
83. BADIOU, supra note 3, at 145 (referring to the State as a “measureless enslavement”).  
84. KRIEGEL, supra note 77, at 5–6.  
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dimension of citizen status? Even when its correlate is the establishment of norms 
of state civility that can be hailed as political-ethical achievements, the morally 
dark circumstances of their emergence is an obstacle to appreciating these norms. 
Hume’s History of England offers a vivid illustration. Amid the innumerable 
cruelties and perfidies of England’s Irish Rule documented by Hume, a few 
colonial policies initiated during James I’s reign strike him as worthy of a civil 
state.85 Through post-colonial eyes, many will regard these policies as equally 
invidious, except perhaps for one: the abolition of wergild. 
Ubiquitous in medieval European customary law, wergild was an organized 
compensatory system for dealing with murder, in situations in which 
ethnic/racialized or religious communities often coexisted in an atmosphere of 
poisonous mutual fear and suspicion. Wergild was a license to kill for whoever 
could afford the tariff. The fine for murder was determined by a sliding scale that 
varied with the ethnic origins of murderer and victim and the balance of power 
between communities and power blocs.86 In Ireland it was called the eric. Here is 
Hume’s grimly humorous account of the challenge it presented to England’s Irish 
rule: 
When Sir William Fitzwilliams being Lord Deputy, told Maguire [an Irish 
clan chieftain], that he was to send a sheriff into Fermannah . . . . Your 
sheriff, said Maguire, shall be welcome to me: But, let me know, beforehand, his 
eric, or the price of his head, that, if my people cut it off, I may levy the money upon 
the county.87 
In a civil prudential spirit Hume presents abolition of the eric as a means “to 
render their subjection durable and useful to the crown of England.”88 In this 
instance “subjection” was to an administration of criminal justice common to the 
kingdom, in which the gravity of the offence of murder supposedly shall not vary 
with the cultural attributes of victim and offender.89 Justice was hardly a keynote 
of Irish Rule; and one of the accompanying subjections of the Irish under James I 
praised by Hume included forced removals from homelands.90 Nonetheless, 
abolition of wergild remains a jurisprudential paradigm of how a civil government 
should conduct itself; in Northern Ireland, as elsewhere, it remains a condition for 
a modus vivendi between still antagonistic religious communities. 
 If this sort of reform is a step towards liberal justice it is not a liberal step. 
The raison d’être of the Pufendorfian state (echoed in Locke) was its capacity to 
redress the radical insecurity resulting from intercommunal strife and the 
autonomies enjoyed by social power blocs, especially spiritual communities, 
 
85. 5 HUME, supra note 81, at 47; 2 id. at 159; 3 id. at 92, 344, 425.  
86. ROBERT BARTLETT, THE MAKING OF EUROPE: CONQUEST, COLONIZATION AND 
CULTURAL CHANGE 950–1350, at 211 (1993).  
87. 5 HUME, supra note 81, at 47. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 49. 
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estates, or clans, by subjecting them to a juridically delimited subordination.91 By 
imposing a portion of equal standing under the law, civil subordination frees up 
some citizens from subjection to the determination of their safety, statuses, and 
life-chances by communitarian or estate-based autonomy. In this way, the civil 
state furnishes a juridical ground for partial dis-identification—for better or worse 
a measure of alienation—from these communal sources of social identity. In this 
way, it displaces the classical Western topography of political space as a city with 
its “parts”—noble families, plebs, and guilds.92 So it paves the way for the familiar 
problem-space of relations between state and rights-bearing individual, whose 
rights could come to be conceived in terms of liberal, social solidarist, or 
conservative principles of liberty; and for its correlate, some version of “the social 
state.” But civil prudence qua ethic of sovereignty is not committed to economic, 
political, or social liberalism. Its problem space is limited to protecting the state’s 
population and resources. Freedom under law is a side-effect of security.93 
Given these historical upsides of civil subordination, perhaps you have to be 
in the grip of an autonomy-based normative democratic theory to identify the 
problems of uncivil sovereign states exclusively with their undoubted record of 
ethnic extermination, warmongering and lesser horrors of draconian overreach; 
neglecting their equally appalling failures to assert their civil-subordinative 
authority. One thinks of how long the U.S. federal government tolerated the 
atrocities and everyday cruelties of the Jim Crow states. 
Unaccepted to this day in many conservative circles, Federalist paramountcy 
over the states began as we know at the 1787 Convention, with the (only ever 
partial) defeat of “anti-federalist” resistance to reform of the confederacy. Like the 
anti-Federalists, not all contemporary debates about the Convention sufficiently 
acknowledge the internal and external threats at that time to the very existence of 
the nascent union. Empowering the federal government with sovereign 
preeminence does of course entail limited subordination of the states, over which 
a civil war was fought. There is an echo of Pufendorf in Abraham Lincoln’s 
understanding of sovereignty as “a political community without a political 
superior.” The history of political thought, historical jurisprudence, and the “new 
institutionalist” histories associated with the American Political Development 
paradigm in political science furnish us with numerous pointers to a longstanding 
civil prudential statist contour—one among other, opposing tendencies—shaping 
the U.S. polity, commonly operating “out of sight” and in tandem with private 
corporate entities.94 
 
91. For his emphasis on what differentiates Pufendorf from liberal thought and gives his work 
pertinence today, I am indebted to Michael J. Seidler, Pufendorf and the Politics of Recognition, in NATURAL 
LAW AND CIVIL SOVEREIGNTY: MORAL RIGHT AND STATE AUTHORITY IN EARLY MODERN 
POLITICAL THOUGHT 235, 235–51 (Ian Hunter & David Saunders eds., 2002).  
92. See Pasquino, supra note 18, at 30–32.  
93. We can see from HOLMES, supra note 13, at 244–45, how John Locke, Baruch Spinoza, 
Montesquieu, and Jeremy Bentham concur with Pufendorf’s view of freedom as security.  
94. On the American Political Development project and literature, see, for example, KAREN 
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This modus operandi is not surprising in light of persistent judicial 
disavowals of the United States’ responsibility to protect its citizens (including the 
most vulnerable, as infamously evidenced in the DeShaney decision95)—as per that 
version of liberal-constitutionalism that mandates appellate courts to be solicitous 
only about citizens’ protection from the state, never by it.96 Civil prudential 
sovereignty is explicit in respect to police powers, but the two instantiations I 
want to discuss are both of a tacit kind. 
The fugitive yet unmistakable actuality of a nondemocratic sovereign 
component of statehood in the United States is nicely captured in Michael Foley’s 
challenge to American constitutionalists’ ethos of “declared rules and stipulated 
powers” as the Constitution’s defining characteristic.97 To the contrary, when 
push comes to shove, that is, in constitutional crises, the American Constitution 
turns out to be no less unwritten than its British counterpart. While evidently not 
unwritten in the traditional generic sense of an absence of codification, the 
American Constitution is studded with calculated under-stipulations in the form of 
ambiguities, disjunctions, irreconcilable contradiction, and anomalies. These 
“gaps” are neither inadvertent nor repairable through legal interpretation allied to 
political initiative. They are symptoms of the fact that from the beginning the 
Constitution was an “unsettlement.” The checks and balances celebrated as an 
index of the Constitution’s rationality are often fig leaves, concealing the 
disjunction between the Convention’s establishment of needful paramount 
powers, and the impossibility (then or now) of rationally agreeing on their 
location, form, and limits. Correlatively, sustaining constitutional governance 
depends on elected office-holders’ acquiescing in “implicit agreements to collude 
in keeping fundamental questions of political authority in a state of irresolution.” 
Foley terms these conventions and the studious in-definitions that they support 
“constitutional abeyances.” The condition for their continuance is that elected 
office holders cultivate what in the civil prudence tradition would be called an 
adiaphoristic “political temperament.” 
The breakdown of these civil conventions is the very definition of a 
constitutional crisis. One of Foley’s two main case studies is the crisis in the early 
 
ORREN & STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE SEARCH FOR AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 
(2004). See also BRIAN BALOGH, A GOVERNMENT OUT OF SIGHT: THE MYSTERY OF NATIONAL 
AUTHORITY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2009) (refuting a view of the federal government 
in the nineteenth century as relatively ineffectual by detailing the influence of little-understood federal 
policies of the time).  
95. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196–200 (1989) 
(holding that a state government agency’s failure to prevent child abuse by a custodial parent does not 
violate the child's right to liberty for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution). 
96. HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, supra note 79, at 88–98 (1999) (discussing the policy rationales 
underlying the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in DeShaney).  
97. MICHAEL FOLEY, THE SILENCE OF CONSTITUTIONS: GAPS, ‘ABEYANCES’ AND 
POLITICAL TEMPERAMENT IN THE MAINTENANCE OF GOVERNMENT, at xiii (1989); see also id. at 
85–130. 
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1970s precipitated by Richard Nixon’s resort to “impoundment”: the president’s 
right to withhold authorization of government expenditures passed by Congress. 
Hitherto this prerogative had been used circumspectly, uncontroversially, and 
rarely. Nixon used impoundment belligerently, secretively, and repeatedly, 
rescinding funding for a swath of welfare and infrastructure measures. 
His actions provoked Democratic Party-dominated challenges not only to 
Nixon’s abridgment of Congressional legislative power, but also to the 
prerogative’s very legitimacy. By his fiscal conservative lights, and in defense of 
that prerogative, Nixon felt justified in using impoundment to counter legislators’ 
financial irresponsibility. But neither he, his party, nor their opponents grasped 
how by abandoning the civility of abeyances, by scrutinizing the prerogative, as 
opposed to leaving it in a state of dormant suspension,98 they were exposing the 
Constitution’s unsettlement, its potential for being not a means to resolve radical 
conflict but an incitement to it. In the end, the prerogative survived, Congress 
saved its honor by acquiring a veto over impoundment, while the Court refused to 
unambiguously rule on the inherency of impoundment.99 
For my purposes, the interest of Foley’s argument is its indications of an 
implicit but non-mystical locus of paramount power within the American polity—
disconnected from democratic decisionmaking and incapable of being rationally 
delineated and confined. 
The aim of the second example is to lend support to my thesis about the 
immanence of the obligation to protect to the very idea of a civil sovereign. The 
United States has consistently (and other imperial states, much of the time), 
avoided laying claims to sovereignty over their foreign insular possessions. Why, in 
the case of Guantanamo Bay, where the United States exercises unmistakable 
dominium, does it prefer to shelter behind the risible judicial veil of a leasehold 
arrangement? In the case of the “guano” islands off Honolulu, “considered as 
appertaining” to the United States by courts, where the federal government 
licensed private corporate proxies to harvest the guano, why was the United States 
for so long able to turn a blind eye to the subjection of American citizens to slave-
like labor conditions? The answer to both questions is at once obvious and telling. 
Scholars of the juristic shaping of American and European imperial conduct agree 
that part of the point was to evade the public law-ethical burdens of protection 
(e.g., due process), encumbrances that are inseparable from sovereign rights.100 
The Constitution follows the flag. Here, in a different kind of abeyance, we see the 
way the responsibilities of a sovereign state are its own. 
 
98. Id. at 53.  
99. See id. at 35–58 (describing the significance of the Watergate scandal and the resulting 
constitutional crisis in the context of the history and defining characteristics of the U.S. Constitution).  
100. See, e.g., MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND 
FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870–1960, at 98–178 (2001); Christina Duffy Burnett, The Edges of 
Empire and the Limits of Sovereignty: American Guano Islands, 57 AM Q. 779, 781, 790–99 (2005); Amy 
Kaplan, Where is Guantánamo?, 57 AM. Q. 831, 834–38, 841–50 (2005).  
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Three ways of testing civil prudential sovereignty neglected in the Article are 
its relation to transnational politico-legal orderings, to rationalities and techniques 
of government and to the domain of the “social,” and to debates about states of 
exception or emergency. With respect to the relations between sovereignty and 
social government, we can note that Thomasius helped establish “police science” 
as a university subject.101 And recent historical research suggests that 
contemporary exercises of sovereign power in respect to national security cannot 
be understood independently of their anchorage in legislation, techniques of 
government, and uses of presidential power (as with Nixon’s misuse of 
impoundment), that are independent of states of emergency. Rather, the occasions 
for the exercise of these powers concern social government.102 All exercises of 
sovereignty and governing power by public authorities pose concerns about over-
reach, and it is to civil prudence’s manner of addressing these that we now turn. 
IV. THE OFFICES OF CIVIL PRUDENCE 
Quis custodiet custodiens?103 The challenge to the civil prudential concept of 
paramount sovereignty cannot be adequately met by invoking worse alternatives, 
or relying on a virtuous “guardian” caste.104 We have seen that according to civil 
prudence’s moral anthropology governors and governed alike need protection 
from one another and from themselves. The imperfect civil prudential answer to 
“Who guards the guards?” takes us back to the idea of the state as a structure of 
jurisdictionally demarcated, impersonal offices. The sovereign state makes itself 
accountable insofar as it binds itself105—applies normative pressure on the 
exercise of its own powers—via its office-based juristic and bureaucratic 
organization. 
 
101. DAVID F. LINDENFELD, THE PRACTICAL IMAGINATION: THE GERMAN SCIENCES OF 
STATE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 13–20 (1997) (explaining that Thomasius was a systematizer 
of Cameralism, a form of which became police science in universities). 
102. On the social and governmental roots of recent administrations’ abrogation of habeas 
rights (e.g., in mental health legislation), see Mark Finnane & Susan Donkin, Fighting Terror with Law? 
Some Other Genealogies of Pre-emption, INT’L J. FOR CRIME & JUST. (2013). Challenging the use of the 
norm/exception couple in respect to government responses to national security emergencies is 
demonstrated in NOMI CLAIRE LAZAR, STATES OF EMERGENCY IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES 19–51 
(2009) (arguing that “emergency need not be understood through the lens of exceptionalism”). On 
the emergence of the concept of the unitary executive in relation to the Reagan administration’s 
political-managerial strategies for shrinking administrative regulation and social support, see Douglas 
C. Dow, The Concept of the Unitary Executive in Contemporary American Political Discourse, 
Presentation to the  Association of Political Theory, Texas A&M University (Oct. 2009). 
103. See Locke’s unsurpassed animal metaphor for this problem. JOHN LOCKE, TWO 
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 328 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). 
104. ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 65–79 (1989); see also HENDRIK 
SPRUYT, THE SOVEREIGN STATE AND ITS COMPETITORS (1994); STATE FAILURE AND STATE 
WEAKNESS IN A TIME OF TERROR (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2003). 
105. On self-binding in this sense and its difficulties, see HOLMES, supra note 13, at 113–20, 
151–52. 
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Hence, insofar as civil prudence is an ethic, it is a role ethic and nothing but. 
Conventionally, a role ethic delineates obligations, capacities, and comportments 
appropriate to an office holder (hence possibly not required of others, or else 
prohibited for them). Moral theory built around the autonomous integral person 
can accommodate such “agent-relative obligations” as long as their legitimacy is 
grounded in universal principles, which an office holder may use to challenge their 
orders.106 Under no condition shall responsibilities folded into an office be 
granted independent ethical standing. 
This attitude to office has a history. Role-skepticism is inseparable from 
critical-philosophical ways of modelling Enlightenment. The critical disposition, 
argues John Pocock, was from its inception staked on “a radical divorce between 
office and critical intelligence.” Enlightened thought about public affairs came to 
be redefined by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Kant as “occupied, and indeed 
invented . . . by those excluded from public office or choosing not to exercise it, 
and acting in the capacity of citizen . . . or critic.”107 Critical intelligence is 
incompatible with office-holding and its implication of subordination. This is the 
assumption behind Kant’s relegation of bureaucratic thinking to the private 
domain;108 Rousseau’s famous hyperbolical speculation on the consequences were 
he to have accepted Louis XV’S offer of a pension—“farewell truth, liberty, and 
courage!”;109 or in our time, Justice Brennan’s opinion that in a self-governing 
republic it is as much the duty of a citizen to criticize the government, as it is the 
official’s duty to administer.110 
It is instructive to pursue this Kantian notion of critical intelligence by 
 
106. On agent-relative versus agent-neutral obligations, and for a full-bore Kantian critical 
analysis of role ethics, bringing it to the higher moral bar set by the moral obligations to which a 
morally autonomous person is subject, see ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES 140 
n.12, 146 (1999). 
107. 1 J.G.A. POCOCK, BARBARISM AND RELIGION: THE ENLIGHTENMENTS OF EDWARD 
GIBBON, 1737–1764, at 147–48 (1999). On the pre-modern “liquid empire of office,” dividing by a 
common language every walk of life, see CONAL CONDREN, ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY IN 
EARLY MODERN ENGLAND: THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF OATHS AND OFFICES 13–146 (2006). 
108. IMMANUEL KANT, An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?, in PRACTICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 11, 18 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., 1996) (“What I call the private use of reason is that 
which one may make of it in a certain civil post or office [in a commonwealth] . . . . [There it is] 
impermissible to argue . . . .”). 
109. THE CONFESSIONS OF JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU 354 (J.M. Cohen trans., Penguin 
Books 1953) (1781). On the two overlapping “moral international” enclave cultures formed within 
the European Absolutist polities in which eighteenth-century anti-civil-state critique flourished, the 
republic of letters and its salons and clubs, and the formidable masonic lodges, the Grand Master of a 
particularly influential French lodge from 1779 to 1782 being Benjamin Franklin no less, see 
KOSELLECK, supra note 77, at 64–123 (observing that the “moral international” comprising the 
masonic lodges “turned into the strongest social institution of the eighteenth century moral world”). 
110. ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
153–54 (1991) (discussing Justice Brennan’s opinion from N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964)); see also STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND COMMUNITY IN 
LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 3–4 (1990) (defining the inward virtuous dispositions of a liberal 
citizen by contrast with those appropriate to a status or role, these in turn being associated with pre-
modern aristocratic society).  
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reminding ourselves of how John Rawls idealizes political civility. It is “a moral, 
not a legal, duty,” and incumbent upon all self-governing citizens—who 
supposedly have an equal share in the coercive power they exercise over one 
another—to explain to one another how the principles and policies they favor are 
braced by public reason, to listen empathetically, and to be impartial in deciding 
whether accommodations to opposing viewpoints are justifiable.111 This Platonic-
realist assumption that civic disputations can be adjudicated by citizens’ exercise of 
critical reason can be contrasted with Pufendorf’s expressly anti-Platonic 
understanding of the judicial office itself. Anticipating Hume, Pufendorf conceives 
justice as an artificial set of imposed conventions and discretionary judgments: 
“the appropriate fitting of [legal] actions to persons.”112 In keeping with this de-
transcendentalized conception of justice-as-civility, Pufendorf denies that the 
judge’s role is to conform penal sentencing to a transcendent logic of 
proportionality vis-à-vis the intrinsically evil properties of the criminal act.113 
“[T]he true measure of punishments is the welfare of the state . . . .”114 
Pufendorf conceptualizes office by inter-weaving the classical Ciceronian 
pluralized conception of moral agency with his concept of “[m]oral [e]ntities.”115 
Whereas attributes of physical things derive from underlying substances, ens 
moralia, paradigmatically offices, possess their characteristic attributes solely by 
virtue of being endowed with “a moral where.”116 The dispositions of an office-
bearer have an ethical meaning by virtue of their occupying an imposed purpose-
built place or status in moral space. An ens moralia is a status imposed 
(“superadded”) by an intelligent superior, human or divine.117 
Concomitantly Pufendorf takes up Cicero’s non-hierarchical distinction 
between a person’s ethical duties and demeanor, qua human being endowed with a 
share in reason, from those attaching for instance to marriage, occupation, or 
those appropriate to someone’s individual character (or the offices imposed by 
their humanity).118 Civil prudence redefined office as impersonal comportment by 
pluralizing moral personality. 
 
111. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 217 (1993).  
112. PUFENDORF, supra note 19, at 31. 
113. 2 PUFENDORF, supra note 17, at 1211.  
114. Id. at 1210.  
115. Id. 4–8. 
116. Id. at 7. 
117. Id. at 5–6.  
118. Id. at 14; CICERO, ON DUTIES 42 (M.T. Griffin & E.M. Atkins eds., Cambridge Univ. 
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Civil prudence redefined the offices of a desacralized civil order around a 
radical pluralization of moral personality. Individuals in public service, in Hunter's 
words, “would have to learn to accede to their civil duties independently of 
cultivating an ‘integral’ moral personality.”119 Thus, Pufendorf discusses how  
one and the same man can be in different states [pluribus statibusital] not 
mutually antagonistic. So the same man can at the same time represent 
several persons . . . . [A]lthough . . . the same person cannot be both 
husband and wife . . . litigant and witness, yet nothing prevents the same 
person from being [simultaneously] . . .  the head of a family, . . . a lawyer, 
. . . a counsellor; in so far, at least, as the various duties concerned do not 
engage the entire man . . . .120  
Civil personae and offices should not be defined by private conscience, and 
religious persons are not immune from civil duties; “he who has gathered from 
the Sacred Scriptures alone the . . . duty of priests, . . . [is] also obligated to 
perform such duties as are required by the constitutions of individual 
governments.”121 
How could one not be reminded of the failure, internationally, of senior 
Catholic officials to fulfil their obligations, as citizens, to report to the secular civil 
authorities sexual crimes against children committed by the priests over whom 
they had oversight? But Pufendorf’s words also call to mind a notable feature of 
the American Constitution’s religion clause case law. In the Supreme Court’s 
calculated under-enforcement of the Free Exercise Clause, there is evidence that 
personnel act in accordance with what Scott Idleman terms an “inherent 
institutional obligation,” qua appellate judges, to “protect and reinforce the 
sovereignty of civil government,” by subordinating religious liberty, simply by 
insisting on compliance with generally promulgated law.122 
Two corollaries of the Pufendorfian ethic of office can be picked out. Firstly, 
there are two ways of being derelict: self-dealing malfeasance and altruistic 
“overfeasance”: yielding to the temptation to follow extra-official ethical 
commitments. In the above example, the Church officials’ dereliction lay not only 
in neglect of the problem, moving child-abusers from parish to parish, but also in 
the more conscientious view underpinning the failure to report criminal offences, 
that the offending priests were in need of in-house pastoral guidance. A statist 
ethic of office can work, in Max Weber’s terms, as an “ethic of responsibility,” 
 
119. HUNTER, supra note 33, at 161. For a lucid argument linking Pufendorf's strategy of 
pluralizing moral personality, depicted as civil personae, to the problem of how to form the personnel 
of a desacralized civil order, see id. at 161–68. 
120. 2 PUFENDORF, supra note 17, at 13–14. 
121. 2 PUFENDORF, supra note 17, at 10–11; For further formulations along similar lines and 
more examples of his pluralization of moral personhood, see SAMUEL PUFENDORF, OF THE 
NATURE AND QUALIFICATION OF RELIGION IN REFERENCE TO CIVIL SOCIETY 93–94 (Simone 
Zurbuchen ed., Jodocus Crull trans., Liberty Fund 2002) (1687).  
122. Scott C. Idleman, Why the State Must Subordinate Religion, in LAW AND RELIGION 175, 188 
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464 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  4:437 
hence as a brake on compulsive overreaching under the sway of an “ethic of 
principled conviction.”123 
Already encountered, the second corollary is cultivation of indifference to 
extra-official commitments. Originating in classical stoicism, in the Renaissance 
the notion of “things indifferent” denoted matters of moral or spiritual evaluation 
deemed neither imperative nor prohibited by divine or natural law.124 Protestant 
sects quarrelled furiously over whether this or that article of faith or rite could be 
treated as adiaphora. Thomasius approached the question from the angle of “[t]he 
[r]ight of Protestant [p]rinces” regarding religions.125 Like Pufendorf, he drew on 
Pietist ideas of inward faith to identify ecclesiastical rites and liturgy as adiaphora, 
tolerable if they posed no threat to peace. Thomasius argued for decriminalizing 
all heresy, yet in Catholic eyes his posture is sectarian: to treat rites as essential for 
salvation is a theological error.126 
Yet a civil ethic of office demands a non-theologically determined 
adiaphoristic attitude. We have noted its requirement to pluralize moral 
personality, hence a need to create “internal boundaries” between official 
conscience and extra-official commitments.127 This may entail working ethically at 
treating one’s personal ethical or faith commitments as adiaphora while acting in 
an official capacity. No prejudgment is entailed about the intrinsic ethical or 
spiritual importance of those commitments. It is that moral effort for sociality’s 
sake that differentiates civil indifference from amoral insouciance. 
Office and its pluralization of moral personality may be “a prized 
accomplishment of western political theory and practice,” yet professional civility 
can be transported into its opposite by over-identification with office or 
“malignant obedience.”128 Delimitation of responsibilities can be invoked, often 
plausibly, as a moral excuse. A state’s military service ethos can clash with the 
guild-like culture and ethos that goes with being a member of a unit or regiment. 
And as Pufendorf insisted, pluralization of moral personality has limits: some 
“hats” should not be worn by the same individual.129 Against the desacralizing 
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thrust of his work, Hobbes actually unified the offices of civil ruler and head of 
the established church, thereby making civil peace depend on religious conformity. 
The Hobbesian sovereign is a pastor-king who determines church law and 
appointments.130 Against Hobbes, Pufendorf argued that the latter office (which 
he considered as consisting in teaching through the power of love rather than 
coercion) and “the Royal Office . . . are of such a nature, that they cannot 
conveniently be [a]dministered by one and the same [p]erson.”131 
That the separation of individual person and office is no panacea against 
pathologies of power is insufficient to gainsay its efficacy and dignity as a 
condition for civil government. You have to think about what happens when a 
sense of office-based constraints breaks down—the Iran-Contra affair is a locus 
classicus132—and of its diverse benefits. Drawing primarily on Pufendorf, I have 
put together a fourfold model of an immanent state. What is an effective brake 
against the tendencies of States to use their powers egregiously and idiotically? The 
foil to civil prudence has been the view that the state can only be made to serve 
the common good when braced by moral principles that are not “of” the state (as 
the Christian is not “of” this world). Civil prudence strives to take account of 
what actually lies within the capabilities of modern states to problematize, correct, 
cope with, and improve.133 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS: TO GRAFT DEMOCRACIES 
“We are here to preserve democracy, not to practice it.”134 We encountered 
this maxim as uttered by a deranged ultra-conservative naval officer, who had 
ceased acting in office.135 The maxim is a staple ingredient in the professional 
ethos of senior military personnel. The military are one of many bodies in a 
democratic state that are “unbound from the political responsibilities 
characterizing elective organs”136—including independent central banks, courts, 
auditing, risk-assessing and statistical bureaus, and inspectorates. Personnel in 
some of these bodies might use the maxim to characterize their (a)political 
responsibilities. But it was at the interface of the military, civilian administration, 
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and legislature that there emerged a telling echo of this protect-versus-practice 
maxim, redolent of civil prudence, which will set the scene for some closing 
remarks about the civil state and its relations to democracy. 
This moment of civil-prudence-in-action occurred during U.S. Senate 
hearings preceding repeal of the military’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” rule.137 Senator 
McCain, an opponent of repeal, cited evidence of anti-gay sentiment among 
combat troops.138 He expressed concern about the military’s failure to ask service 
members if they wanted the law to be changed.139 To this demand that the armed 
services practice democracy, Defense Secretary Gates responded, “‘I can’t think of 
a single precedent in American history of doing a referendum of the American 
armed forces on a policy issue. . . . That’s not the way our civilian-led military has 
ever worked . . . .’”140 
Recall the tenets of civil prudential sovereign power outlined above: the state 
as non-voluntary association, an ensemble of offices, with their respective 
institutionally imposed tasks of behavior—there they are. Gates’ words bluntly 
imply that the military’s acceptance of gays’ right to serve their country without 
hiding their sexual orientation hinged on the armed services’ nondemocratic 
subordination to the federal administration, and of their members. 
Still, his observations were made in a democratic forum and repeal of “don’t 
ask . . .” was voted into existence. In light of this cameo, and in the shadow of 
present-day conservative disgust for the state, how in terms of civil prudence 
might we conceive the impacts of democracy on the civil state and vice versa? 
The shadow cast on state-democracy relations by U.S. conservative forces 
looks dark, from many perspectives. A majority of them are committed to 
evermore “state-skeptical” versions of the American neo-liberal project to roll 
back the New Deal.141 Hitherto bipartisan federal government powers and 
responsibilities vis-à-vis monetary policy, the states, basic environmental 
protections, national frontiers, social provision, and more, are threatened. To this 
prospect add the factor of its grassroots participatory-democratic support, 
deploying modi operandi borrowed from the left to insert itself into the GOP, 
state legislatures, school government boards, and to practice ugly forms of direct 
action directed at voter suppression and the undocumented. 
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Does contemplating these forces give pause to those committed to critique 
of the state and democratization? It is difficult to oppose this hard-right agenda 
without articulating the difference a civil government can make to the possibility 
of reanimating the hyphenation between a dynamic commercial and social-
solidaristic state—even if a civil state as such is not identifiable with this social 
democratic cause. While there exist some effective public philosophies and 
rhetorics along those lines,142 these do not go to the more disjunctive, 
discomforting planes of the state/democracy interface. So here is a silhouette of 
some civil prudence-oriented historical and theoretical understandings of that. 
Contextual history oriented to civil prudence emerged as a more or less 
rhetorically inflected study of matters of normative concern about threats to civil 
peace and sociability. The “fact-values” about democratic life that jump out when 
seen through a civil prudential lens were ethical concomitants of its procedural 
aspects, from Parliaments to protest groups. As I have argued elsewhere, these 
miscellaneous practical dimensions of democracy include mechanisms for  
(de-)selecting a governing personnel—and hence giving the governed a measure of 
control over their leaders143—and the mundane disciplines of democratic 
participation. Some disciplines are built into institutional arrangements like a 
quorum (to protect us from ourselves). Others involve cultivation of civil-ethical 
dispositions required to responsibly run a committee, a rally, a pressure group, or a 
legislature. This array of participatory discipline calls into play—without bringing 
the state into it—many of the office-based ethics of political responsibility that a 
civil ethic of state entails: like the adiaphoristic bearing required to chair a 
meeting.144 But here the focus is on civil-ethical dimensions of democratic 
practices more directly implicated in the state. 
 In a civil prudential spirit, Giuseppe Di Palma offers a descriptive 
understanding of democracy, as a “pool of specifics” with “history and geography 
behind it” in the form of practices and procedures that political actors borrow and 
improvise to form a governing regime. No doubt on account of his realist allergy 
to abstract idealizations of democracy, Di Palma makes no mention of its ethical 
concomitants, as well as more elevated ethoses. And yet he is more moral than he 
knows where he underlines the role of democratic forms in establishing “setting 
up government in diversity as a way of defusing conflict.”145 His de-idealization 
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and disaggregation of democracy are good to think with if we are to understand 
how democracy played a part both in moving away from a state of orders, estates, 
and powerful communal blocs of solidarity to a security and social state; and also 
in preserving those orders. 
 Democratic arrangements as a way of diffusing conflict reminds us of the 
civil peace-based rationale of majority rule (with all its strengths and weaknesses), 
as a technique for supporting a paramount decisional apparatus in the absence of 
consensus.146 But it also reminds us of the ways in which representative 
democracy has also had to come to terms with various older, pre-democratic 
social and political relations, and of how parallel our lobbyist-saturated legislative 
houses are to royal courts, how democracy gave patronage a new lease of life. This 
bifocal perspective on what representative government and democratic culture 
does and does not displace is taken up by the neo-Weberian Wilhelm Hennis. In 
connection with democracy’s relation to “pre-modern” social relations Hennis 
emphasizes links between the notions of political representation and “entrusted 
office.” For him the heart of representative democracy is not popular sovereignty 
and will, but administrative office.147 
 Surely, it will be objected, the notion of democratically accountable 
administrative office solicits reference to the people in whose name it operates. 
True, but let us recollect a crucial mark of the concept of trusteeship, be it political 
or familial. A recent study of Roman law concepts of guardianship and their 
political/constitutional afterlife—from Accursius to Hobbes—reminds us that, on 
the one hand, an abiding condition of a beneficiary of a trust is their limited 
capacity for self-agency, yet on the other, though incapable of exercising 
dominium, the ward in Roman law was deemed the dominus, who might 
theoretically therefore sue for the dismissal of the guardian in the event of the 
latter’s egregious misuse of his tutelary office. Daniel Lee’s argument yields not 
only a plausible origin of the tension between modern constitutionalists’ insistence 
both on vesting constitutive sovereign authority in the will of the people and that 
powers of government must be divided, constrained, and not directly exercised by 
the people themselves.148 It also—by virtue of the brittleness of the analogy—
brings out the commitment to the non-empirical (metaphysical and/or fairytale-
like) stance necessary to sustain this conception of democracy as popular self-
government. The fact in that a representative democratic regime electors have a 
measure of control over their leaders does not have that conception of democracy 
as its condition of possibility. 
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A general civil prudential implication of these sketchy remarks is that we are 
not obliged to consider the public law dimension of state/democracy relations, as 
does Martin Loughlin, in terms of a reflexively mediated dialectic between the 
state’s governmental authority and the people invested with constitutive 
sovereignty in modern constitutions and popular discourse. Democracy, like the 
state, has to be grafted onto many older types of social and political relations as 
well as new ones. Vox populi is one among a range of opinions and powers that a 
regime has to contend with, and adjust to. From a civil prudential point of view 
the people are no more sovereign, no more “constitutive” of the state than the 
super-rich. What I take from Hennis’s historical perspective on democracy is that 
there is no essential dyadic polarity to be held in tension or reconciled. 
 That perspective on democracy is partly underwritten by civil prudence’s 
bleak anthropology. The familiar arguments for and against there being 
nondemocratic hedges against representative democracy in the form of 
“ephorate”—like agencies, like the Federal Reserve, are inchoately indexed to 
divergences about how reckless or foolish legislators can be (in several states anti-
Sharia laws are on the books), on the need for distrusting what even the best 
intentioned people will do with power and resources. As well, the psychological 
inflection of the civil prudential anthropology suggested earlier highlights links 
between democracy and narcissism. I would not give unqualified support to 
psychoanalyst Elisabeth Roudinesco’s generalization that democracy is bound to a 
concept of freedom such that it amounts to “a guarantee for the ego”; still, she 
has a point.149 The politician seeking elected office has to an extent to be a 
flatterer of the ego, pandering to the electors’ intelligence, and, especially in the 
United States, to their sense of their own and the nation’s essential goodness and 
destined preeminence over the world. 
 One way we have available to relate ourselves to democracy is the 
pluralization of moral personhood associated with office-bearing. This suggests 
the possibility of an institutionally based perspectivism, asking ourselves how 
diverse cultures of democracy, office-holders, types of activists, see and relate 
themselves to a state, and vice-versa for the diverse offices of law-states.150 People 
placed in different institutional seats might then be better able to understand both 
the ugly faces of democracies—like the egregious conflict of interest involved in 
devolving the sovereign prerogative of mercy for capital offences to state 
governors—and their undoubted benefits. I have suggested that civil prudence is a 
role ethic all the way down. It follows that it is an ethic for a civil state and hence 
primarily for officeholders supposed to exercise governing power on its behalf. 
But they had better not forget its democratic characteristics, just as civic advocates 
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of social support had better not forget the popular as well as plutocratic 
conservative loathing of their cause and the civil sovereign state that is its 
precondition. 
 As it stands, this reconstruction of civil prudence is full of unassayed 
aporias, moral costs, obscurities, and lacunae. But I have tried to get across to 
readers my sense that in civil prudence we are looking at something like an 
unidentified star in politico-moral space, a tradition that lies outside the box of 
conventional theoretical options. I would also like to think that this Article’s 
sample of civil statist thought gives the lie to images of the idiot-state, such as 
surfaces in Alain Badiou’s speculation that “it is not possible for the State to serve 
as a way in to the investigation of politics, at least not if politics is a thought. . . . 
because the state itself does not think.”151 So to be “intelligent,” an alternative 
political process depends on its being “subtracted” from the state.152 Is that what 
my disgusted fellow symposiast wishes for? 
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